354 F780011-0670 DEPARTMENT OF STATE The Under Secretary To Through: 10 - Haylan Cleveland From

For your information and record is a copy of the notes Ambassador Stevenson used as a basis for his presentation at the NSC EXCOMM this

morning, on the usefulness of presenting the Russians now with a further revision

Attachment. DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/10/77

of the US draft declaration.

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
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NOTES USED BY GOVERNOR STEVENSON AT NSC EXCOMM MEETING, DECEMBER 6, 1962. REFERENCE IS TO DRAFT STATEMENT ON CUBA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SENT TO NEW YORK WITH EXCOMM REVISIONS AS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT TODAY.

We propose following general line of conduct:

If we do not receive Soviet draft by Monday, we should present them our revised draft which will narrow the area of disagreement for study, with statement that we have studied all their objections to our first draft, have met them as far as we can, and that this draft is a far as we can go, that we are presenting it to them now in an effort to conclude the matter as soon as possible -- and that we hope their draft will conform to this. If it doesn't and the area of disagreement is ar wide as our talks indicate then it is apparent that we can't reach agreement anyway and we will have to go back to our criginal position, and therefore the only way to conclude will be to agree to disagree and file with the SYG our separate declarations --(requesting him to circulate them to the SC with what accompanying statement he wishes, including statement expressing gratification that the parties have resolved so much of their substantive disagreement and regretting that the matter can't be finally concluded by total agreement.

Of course



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
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Of course this proposal is made without the benefit of their draft and probably will have to be modified.

- 2. The reasons for proceeding this way are:
- a. If we get our "final" position in <u>first</u> we keep them talking about <u>our</u> paper; rather than crystallizing on a draft of their own -- thus bringing them closer and closer to our draft.
- b. If we haggle too long there are indications that they will get more and more stubborn feeling that we are rubbing their nose in it and diminishing their face saving -- the consequence may be, as they say, to make them more stubborn and intransigent -- to save face -- on other more important issues. After all they have complied with the larger substantive arguments -- removal of the weapons -- and this is a big and embarrassing backdown.
- c. This has been a victory and the longer we prolong the negotiations the more likely that the incessant talk about inspection, safeguards, which we won't get, will create the impression of a failure on a major point -- when finally we don't get it on a continuing basis.

 Moreover there is a remote possibility that we might get it on a one shot basis -- which we don't want. I.E., they might say QK's retrieg in a UN team to look at the sites,

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airfields, etc., to verify compliance -- and many might then feel that we were capricious and unreasonable in demanding more and more.

d. The principal reason against bringing this to an end -- presumably by disagreement -- is public -- and LA -- objection to the non-invasion pledge. Actually it adds nothing to our present obligations under the Rio Pact and UN not to use force except in self defense. It adds nothing to what the President said on Nov. 20. But if this goes on too long the protest may increase as we lose the insulation of the basic triumph -- the removal of the weapons. In Jack McCloy's lovely, liquid metaphor -- we may be piecing away our victory:

